Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy by Colin S. Gray
Renaissance Humans, #28
“A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects.” —Robert A. Heinlein, Time Enough For Love
Welcome to the Renaissance Humans Newsletter, where I focus on sense-making and story-telling in the turbulent twenties. The Renaissance (“rebirth,” in French) spanned from the 14th to the 17th century and marked a period of cultural, artistic, and intellectual renewal in Europe. A Renaissance Human fosters curiosity, creativity, critical thinking, and character in a journey of never-ending learning. They cultivate Mind, Body, and Spirit, in service of Community, and oriented to the Transcendentals.
I wanted to send an essay today, but I have several in percolation mode, not yet fit for human consumption. This week I reorganized my library— a painful but necessary event. And by library, I mean actual, physical books, in meatspace1. Now my external brain is ready to get after it, as the situation requires.
Introduction: Getting the Big Things Right Enough.
A maxim is “a general truth or rule of conduct expressed in a sentence”. The book is designed to provide the intellectual education of a strategist. Intent is to aid politicians, soldiers, and the attentive general public, arming them against the common fallacies in the conduct of war. The hope is that the errors will be tactical or operational, rather than policy or strategic.
Part I: War and Peace.
The nature of war and the relationship between war and peace. War is politics by other means, and politics is war by other means.
1. The Contexts of War Are All Important. They are: political, social-cultural, economic, technological, military-strategic, geopolitical and geostrategic, and historical. Consider events holistically.
2. War Is About Peace, and Peace Can Be About War. War is an instrument of policy. Always have the postwar context in mind. Peace and War follow one another in an endless cycle.
3. It Is More Difficult to Make Peace than It Is to Make War. “The war is over. Now the real fighting begins” —Afghan proverb. War must be conducted with a clear political mission, in such a manner that that mission is not compromised (not too brutal for reconciliation), to a favorable outcome in which the enemy is motivated to seek peace, and flexibly/adaptably, since war is the realm of chance, uncertainty, and friction. When a firm grip by policy is lacking, the dynamics of military action have a way of taking the lead. This is known as mission creep—when a task of limited scope expands, almost naturally and inevitably, according to the logic of events on the ground, and essentially regardless of the original political purpose. The object of war is not simply to win, but to obtain a better peace.
4. War Works! But Always Has Unintended and Unanticipated Consequences. War can solve problems which have been resistant to other methods. Just War Theory- Jus Ad Bellum, provided six criteria are met: just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, proportionality, likelihood of success, and last resort. Beware of causing more problems than you started. There is always a cost—normally blood, money, influence, honor, or reputation. “Battle is the raucous transformer of history because it also accelerates in a matter of minutes the usually longer play of chance, skill, and fate.” –Victor Davis Hanson, 2003.
5. Peace and Order Are Not Self-Enforcing; They Have to Be Organized and Kept by Somebody. International order requires policing to create stability and predictability for nations. Politics are about power (in one formulation), and power is a key to order and peace. Two main approaches- imbalance of power and balance of power. Imbalance- needs a hegemonic guardian of the system, a nation willing to bear the burdens and responsibilities. Balance- US/USSR Cold War- subject to miscalculation by diplomats. Multilateralist approach is a fallacy- consensus is nearly impossible to achieve due to competing interests.
6. Not Only Polities, but Societies and Their Cultures Make War and Peace. There is always a domestic context. American strategic thought of nuclear deterrence, limited war, and arms control are (were) flawed. Better is Thucydides “fear, honor, and interest” to explain group behavior. Strategic behavior is governed by a culture’s interpretation of history, geopolitical situation, and shaped by fiscal constraints. Beware ethnocentrism- our rational choices are not our adversaries. We may not share a strategic framework of understanding. For the strategist, culture is analyzed at 3 levels— public culture, strategic culture, and military culture. They may not always be in harmony.
7. Reason Reigns Over War, but Passion and Chance Threaten to Rule. Clausewitzian trinity- Reason, Passion, and Chance. Beware emotional injection and the needs of the mission warping policy aims (policy serving war). “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always makes war a remarkable trinity- composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its elements of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” -Carl von Clausewitz, 1832
8. There Is More to War than Warfare. It is a legal state between belligerents and an institution in international relations. Deadly combat with coercion/intimidation as methods. When war is reduced to fighting (warfare), the logistic, economic, political, diplomatic, and social-cultural contexts are neglected. It must be guided by prudent policy. In order to secure peace with security, the vanquished must accept their defeat.
9. Policy Is King, but Often Is Ignorant of the Nature and Character of War. Every war is different— it’s hard even for advisors to provide expert judgment. Three reasons for this- The grammar of war may be moving so rapidly that the military profession lacks confidence in its grasp of what is and is not now possible. War is “a house with many rooms.” (T E Lawrence), and there is a wide spectrum of possible activities (conventional to irregular war). Finally, it is near certain that the enemy will have a vote in a surprising way.
10. War Is Always a Gamble. There are too many diverse and interacting dimension to be reliably controlled by one element. Some sources of uncertainty: The enemy, ourselves, and the unexpected— at political and military levels. It’s always a roll of the “iron dice.” You can reduce and mitigate, but you can never eliminate the risk.
Part II: Strategy.
The realm of strategic behavior, which can only make sense when guided by political considerations. The bridge between political intent and military power.
11. Knowledge of Strategy Is Vital; The Flame of Strategic Understanding Has to Be Kept Lit. Strategy is the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy. Dunning-Kruger effect with politicians- they don’t know what they don’t know. Strategy is the bridge between policy formulation and military use. There must be strategists, and they must work to educate those involved in war.
12. Strategy Is More Difficult than Policy or Tactics. Not more important, but difficult. To succeed, all three levels must get the right approach. The strategist is in the business of currency conversion, in a context that lack a stable rate of exchange, straddling the sociological, cultural, and professional frontiers that divide civilian politicians from soldiers. So many levels to considers (Clausewitz had 5- moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical. Historian Michael Howard had 4- social, logistical, operational, and technological). Colin Gray (author) has 17, clustered in 3 broad topics- People and Politics- people, society, culture, politics, and ethics; Preparations for War- economics and logistics, organization (defense and force planning), military administration (recruiting, training, equipping), information and intelligence, military theory and doctrine, and technology. War Proper- military operations, command (political and military), geography, friction (chance and uncertainty), the adversary, and time.
13. Bad Strategy Kills, but So Also Do Bad Policy and Tactics. Strategy choice determines if policy goals are viable, and set the scope of conditions for tactical execution. In principle, policy should drive strategy, which should drive tactics. In practice, the strategist translates the realm of the possible both up and down the hierarchy, and should have a good understanding of the other levels.
14. If Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz Did Not Say It, It Probably Is Not Worth Saying. No new ideas in strategy. These three are must reads- as history and philosophies of war.
15. The Strategic “Concept Du Jour” Will Be Tomorrow’s Stale Left-Over, Until It Is Rediscovered, Recycled, and Revealed as a New Truth. Nothing new under the sun. Examples- Revolution in Military Affairs, Network-Centric Warfare, Effects-Based Operations. See Maxim 14.
16. The Enemy Too Has a Vote. “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth”- Mike Tyson. But you can’t wait for the enemy to show his hand—you must act, and act confidently because of the importance of morale. Keep in mind the range of enemy actions, but focus on what you can control/mitigate and execute.
17. Time Is the Least Forgiving Dimension of Strategy. Everything else can be recovered, changed, improved. Time is a weapon which can be wielded by either side (See the Taliban)- there is a time for aggressive action, and a time for Fabian2 conservation. Irregular war can only be won by triumphing over the political will, the psychological determination of the enemy— not victory on the field of battle. Time may appear to be neutral, but in practice one side has better staying power- both political and psychological as well as material.
18. Friction Is Unavoidable, but Need Not Be Fatal. “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.3 The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” Carl von Clausewitz, 1832. War is the most complex human endeavor, and all sides suffer from friction. Work on eliminating your own, and increasing your enemies. Expect and build friction into your plan by keeping things simple and keeping forces/assets in reserve. Organize, equip, train, and behave with friction in mind. “Human limitations, informational uncertainties, and nonlinearity are not pesky difficulties better technology and engineering can eliminate, but built-in or structural features of the violent interaction between opposing polities pursuing incommensurable ends we call war.” (Bolded because like Charlie Brown and Lucy, we alway fall for this one) —Barry D. Watts, 2004.
19. All Strategy Is Geostrategy: Geography Is Fundamental. “Geography had been taught for too long a time by men who failed to grasp that politics is destiny, and politics had been directed and also taught for too long a time by men who failed to grasp that land and sea spaces, too, are destiny.” Hans W. Wiegert, 1942. All strategy must direct behavior in distinctive geographical environments; each of the five geographical environments: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace— has unique characteristics that dominate, not merely influence what can be achieved in and from them militarily. Security communities must not only wage war in geography—they usually wage war about geography. Even when war is not primarily about contested geography, it must always have geographical referents. The culture of policy-makers and soldiers everywhere, which is to say their values, beliefs, habits of mind, and standard practices, are influenced pervasively by geography. The geography of their communities is the key to their histories, as interpreted; it has been the shaping force in those histories.
20. Strategy Is Not Wholly Military. There is a delineation between Grand Strategy and Military Strategy. The former encompasses the aforementioned aspects (social, economic, technological, etc.). It is supremely difficult to leverage the various dimensions in pursuit of a national security objective. “Above all, any scheme of grand strategy will require coordinated action in diplomacy, propaganda, secret operations, and the entire economic sphere, as well as in military policy. Even if there is no elected parliament to challenge the executive and its scheme of grand strategy, even if there are no interest groups capable of opposing the required policies, the highly diversified bureaucratic apparatus of modern states is itself a major obstacle to the implementation of any comprehensive scheme of grand strategy.” Edward N. Luttwak, 2001.
21. The Impossible Is Impossible; It Is a Condition, not a Problem for Which a Solution Has Yet to Be Found. At times policy makers demand the impossible of the military- and such aims must be brought down to reality by strategists. Example- Germany in WWII- the aspects of weather, terrain, distance, enemy order of battle, production capacity- all these things were knowable at the time. Dunning-Kruger again at work- those who need this maxim the most appreciate it the least. Example of an impossible aim- eliminating all terrorism.
Part III: Military Power and Warfare.
Operational, Logistic, and Tactical considerations.
22. People Matter Most. “True revolutions happen, above all, in the minds of men.” Ralph Peters, 1999. The human element is impervious to changes in technological, social-cultural, or any other of war’s major contexts. A rash individual or two, acting for reasons known only to themselves, and not always then, have the potential to embarrass many an impressive theory of statecraft and strategy. Morale within military units is the single biggest contributor to success. Total output is the product of the means at your disposal and the strength of your will. Human behavior is always influenced and sometimes driven by deep-rooted attitudes, beliefs, and habits of mind that we call cultural. Rational acts depend on the cultural context in which they are taken. “Historically, good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships; over and over again the French revolution taught this lesson, which our own age, with its rage for the last new thing in material improvement, has largely dropped out of memory.”4 Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1892.
23. Military Power Is Trumps in Politics. “The unarmed rich man is the prize of the poor soldier.” -Niccolo Machiavelli, 1521. Politics is about power and international politics is about the relative distribution of power among security communities. When warfare becomes dominant, it twists and subordinates the policy aims to military ones. The Roman empire fell not because of domestic corruption or religion, but from failure to meet military obligations. Diplomats must be backed by rough men with swords as well as by elegant phrasemakers and the inventors of cunning political schemes. This maxim is intended to remind peaceful societies how fragile and tenuous that peace can be, and at times military force is the only solution.
24. Military Excellence Can Only Be Verified by Performance in War. Professional skills of all kinds can only be honed to a condition of excellence, and verified to be such, through frequent practice. Military institutions prepare to fight in the manner that they prefer, unless strategic circumstances or orders from above, which is to say politicians in the latter case, command otherwise. They don’t have to be perfect—just good enough and adaptable enough to prevail.
25. Military Excellence Cannot Guarantee Strategic Success. Western armies typically view warfare as an alternative to bargaining, rather that part of an ongoing bargaining process. It must be tied to the end state. “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test (The demands of policy, which vary with the nature of the motives for war and of the situations which give rise to them) the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” -Clausewitz. Armed forces must be fit for a variety of purposes as mandated by a range of strategic challenges.
26. Victory in Battle Does Not Ensure Strategic or Political Success, but Defeat All but Guarantees Failure. War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. Irregular wars are rarely concluded by a military decision- they are contests of political will and endurance. Rare exceptions where military defeat leads to success (Egypt in ’73 leveraged conflict with Israel into a favorable treaty).
27. There Is More to War than Firepower: The Enemy Is Not Just a Target Set. “It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. The enemy in war is a group of people. Some of them will have to be killed. Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. The overwhelming majority, however, have to be persuaded. They must be persuaded not merely of the shocking awfulness of American power, but the desirability of pursuing the policies the U.S. wishes them to pursue.” Frederick W. Kagan, 2003. War is not reductionist, technology won’t win it for you, there are limits to firepower, and it will take more than high explosive to prevail. Machines are not more important than people. Firepower is still important- all warfare is a mixture of firepower, maneuver, and shock, but some circumstances call for less force rather than more.
28. Logistics Is the Arbiter of Strategic Opportunity. “Amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics.”5 – Omar Bradley. What is logistically infeasible is by extension strategically infeasible. Morale is more important than logistics, but bad logistics will lead to bad morale. In the American Civil war, logistics, strategy, and tactics were of paramount importance- in that order.
Part IV: Security and Insecurity.
Why is strategy important? Considerations of the nature, dynamic character, and functioning of world politics.
29. Bad Times Return. Bad times—political instability, disorder, of sufficient seriousness to render multinational conflict a plausible possibility. It rejects as fundamentally flawed the proposition that we humans are slowly, if irregularly and with setbacks, making progress toward a more stable, less disorderly, less war-prone world order. Humans hard-wired to go to war over the “Thucydides Three6” – Fear, Honor, and Interest. The goals of the strategist are to delay the return of the bad times as long as practically possible, and to make the bad times less severe than they could be.
30. There Are Always Thugs, Villains, Rogues, and Fools Out There, as Well Some in Here, Who Mean Us Harm. The business of international security is conducted, as it has always been, by people of all personality types and with every character flaw imaginable. Those so flawed as to be obviously dangerous both at home and to others abroad generally self-destruct or are forcibly removed by alarmed subordinates. Transcultural empathy is difficult to achieve, and in additional to cultural differences, each human leader comes with his own set of flaws/peccadillos. The fools are the most dangerous of the group, as they reliably fail to respond to signaling.
31. Superthreats Do Appear. Nothing in literature to describe this, but an example is Nazi Germany- a powerful state and an extremist leader. Al-Qaeda after 9/11 another example. Criteria: 1. Must be uniquely substantial in the contemporary metrics of menace; 2. Must appear as a historical discontinuity, even if it emerges only gradually; 3. Must be unfamiliar in character to those who conduct normal security business; and 4. Must pose a threat not just to the stability of the current international system, but also to the very existence of that system. Superthreats do not normally reveal their true character until it is too late for normal statecraft to take effective preventative measures.
32. Prudence Is the Supreme Virtue in Statecraft and Strategy. A prudent person is one who is careful to avoid undesired consequences from behavior. Idealism is an illusion, a pleasant mirage. Clausewitz warned of the uncertainty and risks of war, likening it to a game of cards—the realm of chance. Remember fear, honor, and interest. No guarantee other nations will behave with prudence, especially as some obtain nuclear weapons.
33. Strategic History Punishes Good Intentions. The good strategist must be able to untangle moral considerations from strategic ones. The world is awash in injustice. It’s all but impossible for strategy and ethics to engage in meaningful dialogue— different worlds, different assumptions, lack of common ground for intelligent communication. There are categories of national interest: 1. Survival interests; 2. Vital interests; 3. Major interests, and 4. Other interests. Only one and two need to be protected by military means. Beware of self-deception, particularly with the prospect of changing other parts of the world. If moral impulse is not chastened by strategic calculation, it can lead to disaster.7
34. Defense Costs Are Certain, but Security Benefits Are Uncertain and Arguable. Strategic has economic components. Politics is master, and military power is servant, but politics is only master of strategy it can afford. In common with love, security is a feeling, a perception. A society must grapple with how much insecurity it is willing to tolerate. Most defense budgets function like insurance policies, and it’s sometimes difficult to justify expense to taxpayers.
35. Arms Can Be Controlled, but Not by Arms Control. If wars are caused by fear, honor, and interest, then arms are simply an expression of those concerns. The theory of arms control is flawed and incorrect- the states which need the most arms control are the ones most disincentivized to employ it. Arms can only be controlled by deterrence.
Part V: History and the Future.
Taking the long view.
36. Nothing of Real Importance Changes: Modern History Is Not Modern. “There is no ‘modern’ world. As future crises arrive in steep waves, our leaders will realize that the world is not ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’ but only a continuation of the ancient- a world that, despite its technologies, the best Chinese, Greek, and Roman philosophers would have understood, and known how to navigate.” Robert D. Kaplan, 2002. You can learn about statecraft and strategy from any period- the most important factors/tenets do not change.
37. History Can Be Misused to “Prove” Anything, but It Is All That We Have as a Guide to the Future. This is similar to manipulating statistics to serve your argument. America typically doesn’t like to look to the past- it is a forward looking, optimistic nation, favoring technological solutions over human or ideas. We can prove or disprove nearly any premise by cherry-picking historical data.
38. The Future Is Not Foreseeable: Nothing Dates So Rapidly as Today’s Tomorrow. “It is impossible to predict the future, and all attempts to do so in any detail appear ludicrous within a few years.” Arthur C. Clarke, 1962. Although the future is unknowable, we must still cope with it. The strategist must honor two virtues above all others when dealing with the future- prudence and adaptability (or optionality, a la Nassim Taleb).
39. Surprise Is Unavoidable, but Its Effect Is Not8. Expect to be surprised, thus adaptability is the preeminent virtue. Prudence will aid in mitigating/minimizing the harms of surprise. Surprise occurs in 4 forms: 1. Political, 2. Strategic, 3. Operational, and 4. Tactical. Example: D Day was an operational and tactical surprise. German solution- mobile Panzer reserve element. At present, U.S. must be able to compete in regular and irregular conflict, as it will be faced with both.
40. Tragedy Happens. “Delenda Carthago”—Carthage is destroyed. It is the duty of the strategist to keep the flame of understanding regarding war alive, and to look for ways to turn the tragic situation around, improving the strategic competence of the society in which he serves as he can.
Afterward: Cannon Lore
Five bold claims
1. Even if some readers are uncomfortable with the concept of a maxim, still they should have found the content of the forty essays offered in explanation well worthy of reflection. There is something for everyone.
2. The maxims reflect and express a coherent worldview, a holistic story about statecraft and strategy.
3. Each of the maxims deployed and explained here enjoys authority because they meet 4 critical tests: A. Empirical, which is to say historical accuracy, B. Logical integrity, C. Common sense, and D. Practical Utility. Not just knowledge, but useful knowledge.
4. There is little worth reading relating to a general theory of strategy. This book aims to contribute to that genre.
5. Strategy is a pragmatic undertaking and it is made and remade in a process. This process can be so arduous, and the necessary compromises can be so contestable, that the participants, the strategy-makers, lose sight of the fundamentals that should help guide them.9
Currere Certamen Tuum
My wife is considering a family intervention because of the out of control book situation.
The Roman general Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (Which, if you say three times fast, you can summon him like Beetlejuice.) gave the name to the “Fabian Strategy” which General George Washington used to great effect against the British in the Revolutionary War. By refusing to meet your opponent in pitched battle, you deny them a decisive victory, and you can exhaust them. Same thing Muhammad Ali did with his “Rope A Dope” strategy against George Foreman in the 1974 Rumble in the Jungle fight.
Anyone that has ever loaded children into a car for an outing of several hours intuitively grasps this principle.
Preach, High Priest Mahan!
Then there’s this badass Army Colonel (Jim Greer) who said “Amateurs talk Tactics, Journeymen talk Logistics, Masters talk Information”, but we’ll put a pin in that for the moment.
I banged this into my Naval History students’ heads over and over again. It took much longer than I thought it would.
U.S. policy and strategy in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021.
This is why I called my Master’s Thesis Preparing to be Unprepared.
At the end of the day, you have to flow with it, baby.
Man, this is something. I’ll have to read it again and explain to my wife my book habit is ok: Adam said so!
Keep at it mate
Regarding #30, should we bring back the death penalty or stay with life imprisonment? All kidding aside, Another excellent piece, sir. Really enjoyed that. Wish I still was in touch with a next door neighbor who got into the Blue Angels and was willing to discuss war and philosophy.